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Antisemitism on the streets
Although the Jewish community has become used to attacks on its members and its institutions, and media coverage of them, the trashing of a synagogue, the ripping of the Torah scrolls and the scrawling of swastikas still shock us all and generate enormous sympathy from the surrounding community. Such acts inevitably lead us to question whether we are once again facing a rising tide of antisemitism, as some have suggested, or whether it is the intense media coverage of these incidents that is making us feel less secure as a community. The fact is that reported antisemitic incidents, following a small rise in the mid-1980s and again in the early 1990s, have remained virtually steady. What is remarkable, or unremarkable depending on one's point of view, is that the figures are so consistent. There is a general background level of antisemitic violence, verbal and physical, against which we all live our lives. What is certainly noteworthy, and alarming, is the direction from which antisemitic hatred is now coming, and its recent increase. How then do we explain these conflicting trends and how do they manifest themselves? (See Figure 1.)
The routine systematic compilation of reports of antisemitic incidents in the United Kingdom began in 1984, but the system of compiling these was changed in 1990 to ensure consistency and greater accuracy and to bring them into line with international moves to regularize the gathering of such statistics by Jewish communities. In Britain incident reports are gathered from the victims themselves, from press reports and from the police. During 2001 the Community Security Trust (CST), the monitoring body, was accorded third-party reporting status by the police, which allows it to report antisemitic incidents to the police and act as a go-between between them and those victims who are unable or unwilling to report to the police directly. The CST's investigative capacity has also been used by the police on occasions. Given that the system is a non-statutory voluntary one there are bound to be omissions but the CST's figures are accepted as accurate by government and the police. Regular meetings at Scotland Yard have confirmed that the CST's statistical trends by incident type and quantity very closely match those of the police, but the CST's absolute totals are constantly lower than those reported to the Metropolitan Police Service. That the CST under-reports is suggested by the fact that it records the mass distribution of a single leaflet as one incident although there may be hundreds of recipients, whereas police forces may each record the receipt of that item as a separate incident.
Three broad trends emerge from an examination of the statistics (see Table 1 for definitions). Over
the twelve-year period, from 1990 to 2001, 3,326 antisemitic incidents were recorded, an average
of 282 per year, or 23 per month. The monthly averages show little substantial variability. This
compares with the six-year period from 1984, when statistics collection began, to 1989, when there
were 1,037 incidents or an average of 173 per year. Dividing the twelve-year period into three four-
year cycles shows that the first peak period, with an average of 281 incidents per year, was from
1990 to 1993. Thereafter, from 1994 to 1997 the average monthly figures fell to an average of 255
per year. During the final period, that is from 1998 to 2001, the average yearly total rose to 305
incidents. However, if the unusually large number of 405 incidents for 2000 is removed, the
average annual figure falls to 272.
The trend becomes more apparent if the twelve-year period is divided into quarters. Here the average annual number of incidents rose from 173 in the 1984–9 period to 269 in the 1990–2 period. It rose again to 301 incidents per year between 1993 and 1995, but fell from 1996 to 1998 to 228 incidents. During the final quarter, from 1999 to 2001, the average rose to 328, but only to 290 if the 2000 total is removed (see Figure 2).
We cannot ignore the high number for 2000. We have to examine the reason for it and draw conclusions, but the first broad trend is clear. Incidents rose during the early 1990s and fell back during the mid-1990s. The reasons for this have been noted by several commentators.(1) The growth of far-right activity and, in particular, the May 1990 desecration of the Jewish cemetery in Carpentras in France led to a spate of cemetery desecrations throughout Europe. In Britain, in the wake of the decline of the National Front (NF) and its replacement by the more overtly Hitlerite British National Party (BNP) and Combat 18, activists from all groups were responsible for racist violence and the widespread dissemination of Holocaust-denial propaganda and the promotion of Jewish conspiracy theories. Additionally the early 1990s witnessed the growth of campaigning anti-Jewish Islamist organizations in Britain, starting with Hizb ut-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party), led by the Syrian expatriate Omar Bakri Mohammed. The Iranian-inspired campaign against Salman Rushdie, which began in 1990, also prompted the development of campaigning Islamist groups, and many of them imported the antisemitic ideologies of their sponsoring organizations in Iran, the Arab world and Pakistan. The fall in the average number of incidents from the mid-1990s was the consequence of the criminal prosecutions of BNP and NF activists, charged with the distribution of targetted anti- Jewish literature, such as Lady Jane Birdwood and Nick Griffin, and the imprisonment of leading members of both organizations for racial violence. The calming influence of the Madrid and Oslo peace conferences between Israel and its neighbours also undoubtedly played a part in reducing tensions in so far as pro-Palestinian perpetrators were concerned. During the last quarter the average number of incidents rose again as a consequence of the overspill of tension in the Middle East, of which more later. The second broad trend that emerges is the decline in the distribution of targetted antisemitic literature, which is entirely a feature of far-right activity. During the first quarter of the period this declined from 15.7 per cent of the total number of incidents to 15.3 per cent of the total in the second quarter, to 13.9 per cent in the third quarter, and to 12.0 per cent in the last quarter. This decline can be attributed to two factors. First, the prosecution, or threat of prosecution, of the neo- Nazis who published and distributed such literature. This only came about after the amendments to the incitement provisions of the Public Order Act in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. These amendments more easily allowed for prosecutions and demonstrated a new willingness to deal with mounting public criticism of government inactivity. It had long been the contention of the Jewish community that the failure to prosecute during the late 1980s had encouraged the continuing distribution of such literature, which in its nature became ever more extreme, culminating in threats by Combat 18 leaders to harass and even kill leading members of the Jewish community and anti-fascist campaigners. Whether they were capable of carrying out their threats is immaterial: they made the threats and gave instructions to their followers by reproducing bomb-making plans and assassination techniques lifted from American army manuals. It was only a matter of time before someone used them. The inability, and even reluctance, of the Crown Prosecution Service to prosecute such literature generated a public debate culminating in public criticism of the then Attorney General by the Commissioner of Police, and acrimonious discussions and correspondence between the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Home Secretary, Attorney General and Solicitor General.(2) Parallel to this trend was the temporary decrease in violence against members of the Jewish community and its institutions. Grouping together categories 1, 2 and 3 shows that assaults dropped from 34.7 per cent of the total number of incidents to 31.1 percent during the second quarter, then declined further to 25.5 per cent of the total. Thereafter, however, incidents rose to 32.0 per cent of the total (see Figure 3).
The reduction in violent acts came about primarily because of the decline in neo-Nazi street activity. Synagogue and cemetery desecrations at one level, and assaults on the streets at another, were almost always committed by supporters of the NF, BNP and Combat 18 but, by the late 1990s, their influence had begun to wane as internal dissension broke up their organized street- level activity, and the prosecution of many of their most active leaders left them without strategic direction, at least as far as anti-Jewish activity was concerned. It is worth noting, however, that when several of the cemetery desecrators of this period were caught they turned out to be pre-teen boys operating in small groups of twos and threes. Obviously the larger-scale desecrations involving the smashing of dozens and even hundreds of tombstones required larger groups of adults and a degree of planning. It is the third broad emerging trend—the temporary fluctuations that have their origins in Middle East tension or the continuous media criticism of Israel—that is new and has also recently been the occasion for much comment.(3) This factor first emerged clearly after the Israeli government deported Hamas activists to Lebanon in December 1992, but was more marked after the army attacked the Lebanese village of Qana in March 1996. It was again apparent and even more striking in October 2000, following the start of the Intifada, when incidents rose from 23 incidents in September to 105 in October, falling thereafter to 42 in November and 21 in December. Recent manifestations of the trend occurred yet again in September 2001 following the al-Qaeda outrages against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September, which many in the Arab world blamed on Israel, and again in April 2002,after the Israeli army reoccupied West Bank towns. October 2000 proved to be a watershed with regard to incidents. There appears to have been a genuine change, both qualitative and quantitative after this point. For example, there were 22 synagogue desecrations, ranging from daubings to serious break-ins in the 22 months before October 2000, but 78 in the 22 months since. Also, assaults on members of the Jewish community since October 2000 have often been sustained beatings leading to hospitalization, compared with the 'roughing up' that more typically occurred before this point, and that appears on the evidence to have been perpetrated by neo-Nazis. Although the available data are incomplete, CST records do show that an increasing number of incidents are not only caused by the overspill of Middle East tension but are caused by Muslims or Palestinian sympathizers, whether or not they are Muslims. This visible trend suggests that surges of antisemitic incidents may be visible manifestations of political violence, perpetrated against British Jews in support of the Palestinians. Political violence, including racist violence, rises and falls in accordance with the support it perceives from the surrounding environment. The left-liberal media obsession with Israel and its consequent demonization, and an increasingly blatantly antisemitic Arab and Muslim media help to create such an environment. It could also be argued that the repeated failure of the anti-racist left to condemn such excesses further legitimizes antisemitic behaviour in the eyes of its perpetrators. Calls to arms by jihadist organizations, which have been primarily directed against Israel, almost inevitably mutate into antisemitism around the world, and no less so in the United Kingdom. For example, the UK-based Azzam Publications, in its call to end demonstrations against Israel, argued that demonstrations achieve nothing as the 'US government is controlled by Zionist Jews' and ' the Jewish-controlled media is predominantly biased against the Muslims . . . the Zionist Jewish media manipulates the minds of intelligent individuals to convince them of the legality of their crimes.'(4) During September 2000 the most prominent contemporary radical Islamist group in the United Kingdom, Al-Muhajiroun, published an 'Appeal for recruitment' including an advertisement for a 'Rally for Al-Aqsa' that proclaimed 'the day of Judgement will not come until the Muslims fight the Jews and the Muslims kill them'.(5) At the same time, using one of its front names, The Khilafah Movement, it published a series of posters bearing the hadith, 'the final hour will not come until the Muslims kill the Jews'. The poster was stuck on the walls of a synagogue in Birmingham as well as in public places in London and Manchester.(6) If there was any doubt that Al-Muhajiroun had diaspora Jewish communities in their sights, they issued another statement: 'we urge Jews in the UK and elsewhere not to show any support for the Israeli regime, whether verbal, financial or physical, or they may allow themselves to become targets for Muslims . . . if you support Israel financially, verbally or physically you will become part of the conflict.'(7) At the extreme end of the Islamist spectrum have come calls from the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization to attack Jewish communities. For example, Osama Bin Laden's right-hand man, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, issued the following statement: Tracking down the Americans and the Jews is not impossible. Killing them with a single bullet, a stab, or a device made up of a popular mix of explosives or hitting them with an iron rod is not impossible. Burning down their property with Molotov Cocktails is not difficult. With the available means, small groups could prove to be a frightening horror for the Americans and the Jews.(8) An Al-Qaeda manual, also found in Afghanistan, called for special units to be set up to target Jews: In every country we should hit their organisations, institutions, clubs and hospitals . . . the targets must be identified, carefully chosen and include their largest gatherings so that any strike should cause thousands of deaths.(9) Nor are Al-Qaeda alone; a recent edition of the Iranian English-language newspaper Kayhan International called for 'incessant attacks on all Israeli and US illegitimate interests . . .the Zionists and their paramours should never feel secure anywhere in this world.'(10) Incitement such as this inevitably produces violence and the statistics show this. Examples include the alleged attempted murder of David Myers in Stamford Hill by Nabil Ould Eddine in October 2000; the attack by four or five boys of Arab appearance against an Orthodox Jewish boy in Stamford Hill in June 2001; the throwing of stones by young Asian men and women at two Orthodox Jewish girls walking to synagogue in Prestwich, Manchester; the attack on two Orthodox Jewish boys late on a Saturday night by a group of young Blacks outside the O2 Centre in Finchley Road, North London, in May 2001; the attack by an Asian man on Orthodox Jews in Edgbaston, Birmingham, in April 2001; the throwing of stones and bricks at the Cheetham Hebrew Congregation, North Manchester, by a group of Asian youths in September 2001 and so on. An attempt by the CST to investigate the perpetrators of attacks during the first five months of 2002, using its own information and that supplied by police forces, indicated that, of the 20 incidents in categories 1 and 2, the perpetrators were described as follows: five white; five Arab; three Asian; seven unknown. Two of the incidents involving unknown perpetrators took place near anti-Jewish demonstrations and may therefore be assumed to be related to the Middle East in that respect. In one of these cases the police informed the CST that the perpetrators were Arabs. In another of the incidents involving unidentified perpetrators a group of Arab-looking youths were described by independent witnesses as acting suspiciously in the area, and may therefore have been involved. More recently the presence of men and children dressed as suicide bombers at Palestinian demonstrations in London or the use of placards and leaflets equating the swastika with the Star of David will inevitably lead to further incitement against the Jewish community, and more incidents, unless the authorities intervene. What is equally apparent, in parallel to this trend, is that incitement from the far right has decreased. This is not to suggest that neo-Nazis have discovered an empathy with Jews, but rather that their focus of hatred has turned elsewhere as a consequence of successful criminal prosecutions and a change of strategy towards the Muslim community in the wake of 11 September. The largest proportion of antisemitic activity, however, is abusive behaviour, which more than any other category reflects the general feelings of those who hate Jews, coming as it does from face-to- face encounters and spontaneous acts. Perhaps more than any other trend this reflects the cumulative effects of biased and/or inaccurate media reporting on the Middle East, or the promotion of hatred against the Jews that comes from the Middle East and from radical Islamist groups. The change in the direction from which antisemitism now comes is therefore a worrying one. It should particularly concern us for two reasons. First, if as the evidence suggests the perpetrators are increasingly young Muslims and Palestinian sympathizers, we have to recognize that they too are also victims of racism. Therefore the Jewish community has to be involved with them in the struggle against racism as fellow victims. However, their community leaders cannot continue to call for ever-stronger action against racism and racist violence without recognizing their own racism and the effects that Middle East tension and the rise of Islamist ideology is having on their members. Second, government and the police, who recognize the dangers of overspill from the Middle East and the tension indicators that the conflict provides should take effective judicial action to stop the new anti-Jewish incitement. As the chairman of the United States Senate Intelligence Committee stated in April: 'The most vulnerable targets now are Jewish targets outside of Israel.'
Notes 1 Simon Epstein, Cyclical Patterns in Antisemitism: The Dynamics of Anti-Jewish Violence in Western Countries since the 1950s (Jerusalem: Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, Hebrew University 1995); Michael Whine, 'Is antisemitism a serious threat to European stability?', International Journal on Group Rights, vol. 2, nos 3–4, 1994. 2 Sir Peter Imbert, Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir George Bean Lecture, delivered to the Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen, London, 1990; Michael Horsnell, 'Jews' leader accuses DPP of inaction', The Times, 29 November 1990; Michael Kerr, 'Jewish leader attacks rise of race hate', Daily Telegraph, 3 November 1990; Tim Kelsey and Anne Sacks, 'Jews angered as cases dropped', Independent on Sunday, 9 December 1990. 3 Harold Evans, 'Anti-semitic lies and hate threaten us all', The Times, 28 June 2002. 4 'Call to end demonstrations against Israel', Azzam Publications, 18 October 2000. 5 'Appeal for recruitment', press release issued by The International Islamic Front, The Palestine Support Council, The Khilafah Movement and Al-Muhajiroun, 7 October 2000. 6 Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed Amir of Al-Muhajiroun, 'Palestine: the Islamic ruling and message to Muslims', 2 October 2000. 7 'Advice and warning to all Jews and Muslims in the UK', press release issued by Anjem Choudary, leader of Al-Muhajiroun, 17 October 2000. 8 Ayman Al-Zawahiri, 'Knights under the prophet's banner, Al-Qaeda', discovered by US forces in Afghanistan after 11 September 2001, FBIS Daily Report, 12 December 2001. 9 'The manual of Afghan jihad', Al-Qaeda, Afghanistan, reported in the Sunday Telegraph, 3 February 2002. 10 Kayhan International, Tehran, 16 April 2002 (source: BBC Monitoring). Michael Whine is the Communications Director of the Community Security Trust and director of the Board of Deputies of British Jews Defence and Group Relations Division. © Institute for Jewish Policy Research 2002 Home/Country
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Two synagogue desecrations during the first half of the year, in Finsbury Park and Swansea, gave
rise to sympathetic media coverage, the like of which the Anglo-Jewish community has rarely seen.
Not only were the attacks the subject of many television, radio and newspaper news items and
editorials but they also resulted in letters of sympathy to the communities concerned from the
Prime Minister, visits by the Shadow Home Secretary and Environment Minister, in the case of the
Finsbury Park synagogue, and a visit by the Shadow Secretary of State for Wales in the case of the
Swansea synagogue. 
