Poland
Poland is a parliamentary democracy. Since 1993 the country has been
ruled by a coalition government formed by the post-communist Sojusz Lewicy
Demokratycznej (SLD, Democratic Left Alliance) and the Polskie Stronnictwo
Ludowe (PSL, Polish Peasants' Party), a successor to the Peasant Party of
the communist era. The government enjoys an almost two-thirds majority in
both houses of parliament. In November 1995 Aleksander Kwaniewski, the chairman
of the SLD, succeeded Lech Walesa as Poland's second democratically elected
president since the collapse of communism.
The Polish economic recovery, which began in 1992, is perhaps the longest
and most durable in East-Central Europe. In 1996, industrial production
rose by 7.9 per cent, while the rise in gross domestic product growth was
just short of 5 per cent. Inflation was reduced to 19.1 per cent and unemployment
from 15.1 per cent to 14 per cent.
On the eve of the Second World War, Poland's Jewish community numbered
3.5 million, which represented 20 per cent of world Jewry. Since the Holocaust
and several waves of emigration during the communist period, only a tiny
remnant of this ancient community remains in the country.
Until the end of the eighteenth century the situation of the Jewish community
in the Polish commonwealth was, on balance, better than in most European
countries. When Poland was partitioned between Russia, Prussia and Austria-Hungary
in 1795, inter-communal relations began to deteriorate as the foreign powers
implemented the principle divide et impera.
Modern Polish nationalism emerged in western Poland in the late nineteenth
century in the form of the Endecja (National Democracy) movement. The Endecja
promoted the identification of Polishness with Catholicism, using anti-Germanism
to construe the "external" enemy and antisemitism to define the
"internal" enemy.
During the period of the Second Republic (1918-39) Jews encountered increasing
hostility from wide sections of the population. The late 1930s witnessed
a wave of antisemitism orchestrated by the extra-parliamentary nationalist
opposition and supported by a large section of the Catholic church.
Following the Nazi occupation of Poland in 1939, the Nazis proceeded to
murder the entire Jewish population. During this period Jews felt that the
majority of ethnic Poles were indifferent to their fate. Although some Poles
did help Jews to survive the Holocaust, most remained passive in the face
of Nazi terror. Poland was the only country in Europe where the death penalty
was imposed for assisting a person of Jewish origin.
Post-war hopes of an improved Polish-Jewish relationship were thwarted first
by grassroots antisemitism, which reached its apo-gee in the Kielce pogrom
of 1946, and then by communist-inspired antisemitism, which culminated in
the "anti-Zionist" campaign of 1968. A similar strategy was used
by the Communist Party against the political opposition in the 1970s and
1980s, when the leaders of Solidarity were portrayed as a non-Polish element.
Throughout the 1980s the Solidarity opposition began a re-evaluation of
Polish hi-story, especially of relations with Poland's ethnic minorities.
Its political élite frequently condemned antisemitism, xenophobia
and ultra-nationalism.
Antisemitic slogans did not disappear in Poland with the collapse of communism,
and resurfaced during the presidential campaign in late 1990. Since 1991,
Lech Walesa and the government of Aleksander Kwasniewski have spoken out
against antisemitism, and the use of antisemitic rhetoric has decreased
in political circles.
Aggressive xenophobic and antisemitic attitudes are confined to a few
marginal political parties and groups such as the skinheads, whose strongholds
are in Gdansk, Gdynia, Lublin and Wroclaw. Antisemitism is one component
of an ultra-nationalist discourse that condemns everything that is "foreign".
In recent years, surveys have shown that the main victims of verbal abuse
have been Roma. The number of reported physical assaults on Roma has been
declining since the early 1990s.
Cases of ethnic tension have been reported in south-west Poland, where the
German ethnic minority is mainly concentrated, and in south-east Poland,
where there is a significant Ukrainian minority.
In Poland only fifteen signatures are necessary to register a political
party. Thus there are over 300 registered political parties, which are constantly
changing their names and alliances. The far-right groupings that resort
to racist, xenophobic and antisemitic rhetoric as their principal message
are tiny and have little political support among the population. However,
even mainstream political parties tolerate such rhetoric from their activists.
The Polska Wspolnota Narodowa-Polskie Stronnictwo Narodowe (PWN-PSN, Polish
National Fellowship-Polish National Party) is led by Boleslaw Tejkowski,
a former member of the Communist Party who is widely rumoured to be of Jewish
origin. It publishes the paper Mysl narodowa polska (Polish National
Thought) and claims a membership of 11,000. The PWN-PSN maintains links
with Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (see Russia).
In the 1993 general elections it received only 0.1 per cent of the ballot.
Its active members are mostly young skinheads (see MANIFESTATIONS).
The Przymierze Samoobrona (PS, Self-Defence Alliance), founded in 1992 by
the former communist Andrzej Lepper, recruits supporters from within the
peasant community. PS activists often ascribe to Jews responsibility for
the economic hardships that have accompanied the reform process. In the
first round of the 1995 presidential elections Lepper won 1.3 per cent of
the votes.
The Polski Front Narodowy (PFN, Polish National Front) is led by Janusz
Bryczkowski and claims 700 members. Founded in 1994, this neo-Nazi group
has had little political success. Bryczkowski was unable to obtain the 100,000
signatures required for his official candidacy in the 1995 presidential
election. In 1996 he was arrested on account of illegal operations in his
extensive trade with Russia.
Other marginal parties that use antisemitic rhetoric are the Polskie Stronnictwo
Narodowe "Ojczyzna" (Polish National Fellowship "Fatherland"),
the Stronnictwo Narodowe "Szczerbiec" (SNSz, National Party "Szczerbiec"),
the Polskie Odrodzenie Narodowe (PON, Polish National Renewal) and the Narodowe
Odrodzenie Polski (NOP, National Rebirth of Poland).
Since approximately the end of the 1980s, skinheads have constituted an
important section of the membership of far-right Polish parties such as
the PWN-PSN and the NOP. The neo-Nazi skinhead scene remains strong and
is concentrated in small towns. There are an estimated 10,000-20,000 neo-Nazi
skinheads in Poland.
The Ruch Odbudowy Polski (ROP, Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland)
bases its policies on anti-communism and the defence of Poland against the
domination of western capital. One of its leaders, Zygmunt Wrzodak, is known
for his antisemitic views. Press statements put out by the Ursus tractor
factory, where he is chairman of Solidarnosc (the trade union Solidarity),
frequently claim the Polish government consists of "Jewish communists"
(see MANIFESTATIONS).
The centre-right coalition Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosci (AWS, Solidarity
Electoral Action) was founded in 1996. Its "Christian democratic"
policy is vague and covers the spectrum from liberal conservatives to populist
anti-liberals. While its leader, Marian Krzaklewski, is not known for antisemitic
utterances, antisemitic slogans have appeared at some AWS demonstrations.
In January, the Polish foreign minister, Dariusz Rosati, wrote to the World
Jewish Congress acknowledging that the 1946 Kielce pogrom was "an act
of Polish antisemitism". Edward Moskal, president of the Chicago-based
Polish American Congress, described the letter as "unfortunate and
unnecessary" and accused the Polish government of indulging the Jews.
Moskal's letter led the American Jewish Committee (AJC) to terminate its
joint sponsorship of the National Polish American and Jewish American Council
in May (see United States of America). Henryk Jankowski, a Catholic priest
from Gdansk known for his antisemitic views, said that Rosati had no right
to apologize on behalf of all Poles and that "apologizing to the Jews
is an insult to the Polish nation". These criticisms did not in any
way undermine the Polish government's condemnation of the Kielce pogrom
(see COUNTERING ANTISEMITISM).
While the law regulating the restitution of Jewish communal property has
not given rise to public expressions of antisemitism, as could have been
expected and was feared, it has become the source of considerable Polish-Jewish
tension. The law, which should be adopted by parliament in 1997, does not
cover the return of private property. Although the govern-mental line has
been that claimants of private property will be treated equally, regardless
of nationality, there is concern in the government that if pressure for
special legislation relating to Jewish private property is brought to bear,
it will bring antisemitism to the surface.
On 6 April members of the PWN-PSN held a demonstration outside the main
entrance to the Auschwitz concentration camp, at which banners were raised
against NATO, the European Union (EU) and Jews. The demonstration was allegedly
intended to pay homage to Poles and other nationals who had been murdered
in Auschwitz and to serve as a warning against the revival of "German
and Jewish Nazism". It was later discovered that Boleslaw Tejkowski
had threatened the local authorities that he would disrupt the March of
the Living, scheduled for later that month (see COUNTERING ANTISEMITISM),
if the PWN-PSN was not authorized to hold its demonstration. The governor
of the Bialsko-Biala district, Marek Trombski, who had authorized the demonstration,
offered his resignation on 10 April.
On 3 May, Poland's national holiday, Tejkowski organized a PWN-PSN rally
in Cracow and called for Polish land not to be sold to foreigners, particularly
Jews and Germans. This sparked off a counter-demonstration of anti-fascist
youth groups under the slogans "Cracow-city without racial prejudice"
and "Fascism is the socialism of idiots".
In June, Zygmunt Wrzodak (see MAINSTREAM POLITICS) used antisemitic invective
to criticize the intellectual opposition of the 1970s, some of whom were
of Jewish background and had collaborated closely with the government of
Tadeusz Mazowiecki during the "shock therapy" reforms of 1990-1.
Wrzodak called the intellectuals "frustrated atheists" who had
used the workers' protests in 1976 to pursue "their own non-Polish
goals", and accused them of wanting "to buy into our Polish Catholic
worker circles in order to get power . . . together with their ideological
brethren, the communists".
In September, at a Germany vs. Poland football match in the southern Polish
town of Zabrze, German hooligans held up banners with antisemitic and anti-Polish
slogans. German police used the video recordings of the incident to investigate
those responsible (see Germany).
In November, during the celebrations of Polish Independence Day in Cracow,
some 200 skinheads took an oath to fight "German, Jewish and American
occupants, the communist and Solidarity government and anti-Polish anarchism".
There were instances of desecration of Jewish cemeteries in Warsaw in July
and in the southern Polish city of Oswiecim, where the death camp Auschwitz
is situated, in November. A seventeen-year-old skinhead was detained following
the desecration in Oswiecim.
In general the Polish media are highly critical of manifestations of
antisemitism. Some mainstream media, however, often publish anti-semitic
material. These include the Catholic daily Slowo (print-run 30,000) and
the right-wing Gazeta Polska (100,000).
Racist publications can be bought relatively easily in kiosks or on the
streets of regions bordering Germany. Titles include Aryjska Krew (Aryan
Blood), Aryjczyk (The Aryan) and Bialy Grom (White Thunderbolt).
According to Polish intelligence sources, the organizations that produce
and distribute these materials receive financial aid and propaganda materials
from Germany.
Recent surveys indicate that negative stereotypes of Jews remain relatively
strong in Poland. When asked to list "nations" with harmful attitudes
towards them, Poles usually mentioned Russians, Roma and Germans. However,
when given a list of "bad nations" that included Jews, there was
a big increase in antisemitic responses. More elaborate analyses contradict
the stereotype of the "Polish anti-semite" that prevails in other
countries. They also reveal the need to distinguish between different levels
of Polish antisemitism.
The first in-depth study of Polish antisemitism published in 1996 and based
on polls conducted in May 1992 distinguishes two kinds of antisemitism-traditional
and religious ("the Jews killed Jesus"), and a more modern brand
of hate ("Jews' power is great and hidden, and they are conspiring
to control politics and the economy"). The study shows that younger,
better-educated people are more likely to be sympathetic to Jews.
Traditional religious antisemitism is found primarily among poorly educated,
older Catholics living in small towns. Modern anti-semitism is present in
all social groups irrespective of education or age. The study suggests that
the number of Polish antisemites is fairly stable, but that there is also
a gradual increase in the number of people "favourably disposed"
towards Jews.
According to a survey conducted by the Centre for Public Opinion Research
in February 1996, 49 per cent of the respondents stated that the largest
group of victims of the Auschwitz death camp were Jews, while 21 per cent
said that they were mainly Polish. The survey also showed that 45 per cent
regarded Auschwitz as primarily symbolic of Polish martyrdom, while 28 per
cent associated it with martyrdom of the Jews and 4 per cent with martyrdom
of both communities. Compared with a similar survey conducted by the AJC
in 1995, this survey shows an increase in the perception of the Jewish identity
of Auschwitz (8 per cent in January 1995, 18 per cent in February 1995,
27 per cent in February 1996). The dominance of the perception of Auschwitz
as the site of the martyrdom of the Polish nation, with the prevalence of
the belief in the Jewish majority of the Auschwitz victims, indicates that
many Poles reject the logic of the Nazi perpetrators ("the Jews were
killed because they were Jewish") and consider the victims Polish citizens,
irrespective of their religious affiliation.
Article 81 of the Polish constitution forbids "the spreading of
hatred or contempt, encouraging strife and humiliating a person for national,
racial or religious reasons". Article 270 of the Penal Code states
that anyone "publicly spreading and praising fascist ideology can face
a prison sentence of between six months and five years".
Despite the legal ban on fascist political parties, groups can easily circumvent
it by excluding antisemitic slogans from the statutes they present to courts
when registering themselves. The current law does not precisely define criteria
for banning a party.
Prosecutors remain reluctant to deal with cases of racial hatred or contempt,
and effective punishment is not easy to come by. The fact that cases sometimes
take five years to reach court reflects the general situation of a judiciary
that is overloaded by the legal disputes that accompany the reform process.
Following the demonstrations held by the PWN-PSN in the grounds of the Auschwitz
camp in April (see MANIFESTATIONS), the government announced its intention
to prepare a bill amending the existing provisions concerning assemblies
and demonstrations at places of martyrdom.
The Polish government has been anxious to shed the country's antisemitic
image and work towards Polish-Jewish reconciliation. President Kwasniewski
has shown a more sensitive approach to Polish-Jewish relations than did
Lech Walesa, and has intervened personally on several occasions.
On 7 January 1997, in Warsaw University's Golden Hall, the Polish Council
of Christians and Jews presented its Figure of Reconciliation Award to Rabbi
A. James Rudin, the AJC's director of interreligious affairs, for fostering
improved relations between Catholics and Jews.
In April, two high-ranking Polish officials attended the March of the Living,
which is held bi-annually to commemorate the victims of the Holocaust.
In July, Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz played a prominent role
during the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Kielce pogrom.
The ceremony, which was held at 7 Planty Street, where the pogrom began,
was attended by the prime minister, Nobel Prize-winner Elie Wiesel, the
secretary general of the Polish Episcopate, Bishop Tadeusz Pieronik, and
the chairman of the US Kielce emigré community. The town's mayor,
Bogslaw Ciesielski, said, "Let us build a bridge over the graves",
and Cimoszewicz expressed his regret for all the wrongs that the Poles did
to the Jews. This event, together with Rosati's letter to the World Jewish
Congress (see MAINSTREAM POLITICS), marked Poland's first official apology
for the pogrom.
In June, following the controversy about the construction of a shopping
mall in the vicinity of the Auschwitz main camp, the government presented
to parliament a comprehensive development programme for the region known
as the "Auschwitz memorial conservation scheme". The first stage
of the programme envisages the reconstruction of thoroughfares and a protection
zone around the site of the former Nazi camp, as well as improvement of
the transport system. The second phase will focus on restoring the old town
of Oswiecim and constructing an international conference and educational
centre. The cost of the entire scheme, to be concluded in the year 2007,
is estimated at $120 million. The plan was also presented by the museum
to the US Holocaust Memorial Museum (Washington, DC) and to American Jewish
groups in July, who in turn prepared a detailed response.
Professor Krzysztof Sliwinski, who was nominated as Poland's roving ambassador
to the Jewish diaspora in August 1995, has continued his efforts to improve
relations between Poland and world Jewry. Sliwinski was an active member
of the dissident movement during the communist era and defended students
who were ostracized as Jews during the 1968 antisemitic campaign. His role
is to foster a constructive dialogue between Poles and Jews that would replace
the traditional atmosphere of mutual accusation and simplistic stereotypes.
There have also been many grassroots initiatives against antisemitism. In
November, anti-fascist organizations mobilized marches "against racism,
antisemitism and intolerance" in Warsaw, Katowice and Lublin. During
the rally in Warsaw, Jacek Kuron of Unia Wolnosci (UW, Freedom Union) and
Cezary Miezejewski of the Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (PPS, Polish Socialist
Party), supported calls for banning Nazi parties such as the PWN-PSN and
the PON (see parties, organizations, movements).
Throughout the year many conferences and lectures on ethnic minorities,
in particular Polish Jewish history, took place in Polish universities.
There is particular stress on the education of the younger generation. Several
summer camps were held around Polish Jewish themes and the AJC organized
an exchange programme that brings American professors of Jewish studies
to teach at Catholic seminaries and Polish academics to teach at Jewish
colleges in the USA. In Warsaw a number of non-Jewish parents have decided
to send their children to the Jewish elementary school set up by the Lauder-Morasha
Foundation. Opinion polls indicate that all these initiatives are starting
to bear fruit (see OPINION POLLS).
Antisemitism plays a diminished role in Polish political and social life,
yet it can surface as a significant factor, as it did in a long drawn-out
debate over the re-privatization law and the restitution of, or compensation
for, expro-priated property. The Polish authorities have sought to encourage
a more objective reassessment of Polish Jewish history. These efforts have
been accompanied by a continuing and spontaneous interest in Jewish history
and culture at the grassroots level, especially among the younger generation.
The electoral failure of the political groupings that make antisemitism
the core of their programme demonstrates that antisemitism is not the main
expression of Polish nationalism. Antisemitic prejudice is still present
at grassroots level, especially among the less educated strata of the population.
However, there is some indication, from opinion polls and the range of activity
designed to counter negative attitudes towards Jews, that antisemitism has
become less pervasive in Polish society.
© JPR 1997