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A DISCOURSE OF DELEGITIMISATION: THE BRITISH LEFT AND THE JEWS
By Ben Cohen
Introduction
In 1965, three years before an eruption of left-wing protest
across Europe and the United States, the American socialist
Irving Howe sounded a note of warning about the growing mood
of radicalism gripping university campuses and sections of the
civil rights movement (1).
In an essay for Dissent, Howe assembled a 'composite
portrait' of what he called the 'New Leftist' - a term he acknowledged
to be 'loose and not very accurate', but the most optimal description
available for what 'sometimes looks like kamikaze radicalism,
sometimes like white Malcolmism, sometimes like black Maoism.'
While
Howe admired the New Leftist stress on transforming the self
as well as society, and while he decried the 'spirit-squashing'
American educational system, which spurred the more sensitive
students to question, to argue and then to disrupt, he identified
several discomforting trends nonetheless. Among them were: a
lack of nuanced thought; a hostility towards liberalism; a vicarious,
if mostly theoretical, indulgence in violence; a visceral anti-Americanism;
an unshakeable belief in the decline of the west, despite empirical
evidence to the contrary; and, most perceptively, a growing
sympathy for authoritarian rulers and regimes in post colonial
states who 'choke off whatever weak impulses there are toward
democratic life.'
By
1968, when the New Left had firmly established itself in the
vanguard of radicalism, much to the chagrin of old-style communists
and social democrats, all these features were still intact.
Global in scope and ambition, the New Left was supremely confident
of its own victory, even if it lacked moral, ideological and
organisational coherence. The near evangelical nature of this
certainty encouraged a view of the world as bisected into 'allies'
and 'enemies', with the identity and social position of a group
determining which camp it belonged to.
There
is a tendency to regard the political trends of the late 1960s
with a degree of romantic affection. Yet closer examination
of those elements that Irving Howe, with remarkable prescience,
identified as troubling should encourage a revisionist assessment.
As a period which has fallen under the gaze of novelists and
filmmakers' almost as much as political scientists and historians,
the latter half of that decade is primarily remembered for its
rejection of the stuffy moral codes of the previous generation
and the advocacy of personal liberation. What becomes obscured
here is that many political activists flirted with decidedly
anti-democratic ideas and movements, such as Maoism in China
and the Viet Cong in North Vietnam. Alongside this was an acceptance
of the legitimacy and the necessity of revolutionary violence,
a position ideologically blessed by Frantz Fanon (2),
whose writings on decolonisation provided an interpretative
framework for the New Left's encounter with nationalism in the
Third World.
The
individual icons of the New Left, such as Fanon, Regis Debray
and Che Guevara (3),
were a step removed from classical Marxism. 'When you examine
at close quarters the colonial context,' Fanon wrote (4),
'it is evident that what parcels out the world is to begin with
the fact of belonging to or not belonging to a given race, a
given species…This is why Marxist analysis should be stretched
every time we have to deal with the colonial problem.' Whereas
social conflict was, for orthodox Marxists, determined by the
relationship of competing classes to the means of production,
the New Left sought to widen the net. 'Allies' and 'enemies'
were social constructs; where one belonged was decided not solely
on the basis of class affiliation, but in terms of group identity
as well. As such, 'imperialists', 'colonists' and 'settlers'
- not necessarily the owners of the productive and distributive
forces, but always foreigners and aliens functioning as agents
of an external predator - were set in stone as enemies. Using
the escalation of the Vietnam war and casting the North Vietnamese
struggle as a paradigm for other Third World nationalist movements,
including the Palestinians, it was only a matter of time before
'Zionists' joined the rogues gallery. A pro-Palestinian
demonstration in London in 1969 offered a flavour of the new
mood when it gathered under the slogan: 'From Palestine to Vietnam
- One Enemy! One Fight!' (5).
Thus
did the Left find itself, once again, confronting its perennial
'Jewish Question'.
The
Problem of Delegitimisation
The relationship between the Left and the Jews has always been
fraught. There are many instances of mutual solidarity, and the
extensive contribution of individual Jews to socialist thought
and practice is well known. However, the abiding impression left
by even a casual probing of the two groups' joint relations reveals
that these have frequently been adversarial. What is often referred
to in Britain and elsewhere as the 'New Antisemitism' (6)
- its points of origin located in the Palestinian intifada of
October 2000 and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and
its defining characteristics made up of an uncompromising opposition
to the legitimacy of Jewish national aspirations and a contempt
for Jewish concerns - is not particularly new. The aim of this
chapter is to examine the historical provenance of the Judeophobic
attitudes which can be found across the continuum of the Left
in Britain specifically, from the extremist fringe to the social
democratic and liberal mainstream.
Although
egalitarian, cosmopolitan, and internationalist principles are
common to all variants of socialist doctrine, these have not
immunised the Left from antisemitism. What the German socialist
leader August Bebel denounced as the "socialism of fools"
is as old and as resilient as the Left itself. What has changed,
however, is the character of the prejudice. To reiterate, the
advent of the New Left led to the downgrading of orthodox Marxist
analysis. Consequently, the orthodox Marxist notion that the
Jews - as an economic agent - perform a distinctive function
within a system purposed for the extraction of surplus value
was replaced by the anti-colonialist notion that the Jews -
as a political collective - remain integral to the maintenance
of imperial (more precisely, American) hegemony on a global
level.
The
shift from the politics of class to the politics of identity
has meant that the Left's main imperative has been to express
solidarity and seek out alliances with those groups opposed
to the dominance of the United States. In this worldview, America
is regarded as the main foe. Any concerns about the political
ideas and affiliations of such groups have been subordinated
to the larger goal of anti-Americanism. A wide range of organisations
have, therefore, been branded as worthy of support, from Latin
American populists like the Frente Sandinista (FSLN) in Nicaragua
to Arab nationalists, of both conservative and radical hues,
in Syria, Iraq, Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organisation
(PLO). In recent years, this comradeship has been extended by
large sections of the Left to the Islamist movements and their
followers in Europe (7).
As the old Arab proverb would have it, 'My Enemy's Enemy is
My Friend.'
The
contemporary alliance between the western Left and nationalist
and religious radicals in the Middle East is of special concern
here. Arab and Muslim radicals have always denied that Israel,
uniquely among the states in the international system, has the
right to exist. That position is shared by a large proportion
of western Leftists. Thus, three points warrant consideration.
First,
the opposition not to Israel's security policies alone but to
its very legitimacy means that, as in Islamist and Arab nationalist
discourse, the terms "Jew," "Israel," and
"Zionist" are increasingly interchangeable in contemporary
Left-wing discourse. In addition, this discourse of delegitimisation
has been standardised and globalised (8).
Finally, the themes and motifs associated with delegitimisation
are increasingly gaining recognition outside the activist margins,
for example, among politicians broadly described as "progressive,"
among prominent academics, and in liberal media outlets.
When
the concept of delegitimisation is introduced, the common refrain
that there is a clear analytical boundary between antisemitism
and anti-Zionism becomes harder to sustain. The Left has always
bristled at the contention that opposition to Zionism equates
with antisemitism, pointing out that many Jews, from the socialists
of the Bund to the fundamentalists of Neturei Karta, have declared
themselves to be anti-Zionists. Yet all this demonstrates is
that anti-Zionist arguments, whether or not articulated by Jews,
can be based upon multiple foundations with very little intellectual
commonality: Satmar and Belzer rabbis, Marxists, Arab nationalists
and Islamists are all opposed to Zionism, but for different
reasons with very little overlap. In addition, to reproduce
old ideological or theological objections to Zionism which do
not account for the history of the Jewish people in the twentieth
century and the associated changes which Jewish identity has
undergone, is somewhat disingenuous. Although there is a dogma
on the Left, as well as among Islamists, that Judaism is merely
confessional, modern Jewish identity increasingly embraces cultural,
religious and national elements. In other words, most Jews do
not see themselves as belonging to a group that is distinct
only in terms of religion. Neither do Diaspora Jews perceive
a contradiction in identifying with the countries in which they
live and expressing solidarity, emotional and political, with
Israel; in that sense, they are very similar to other minorities,
such as Greeks in the United States or Indians in Britain.
What
worries Jewish communities is that standards of extraordinary
severity are applied to Israel alone, thus delegitimising a
major component of Jewish identity. Israel is not condemned
for what it does, but for what it is. Syria and Sudan might
be criticised for their woeful human rights records, but it
is never suggested that either state is illegitimate in itself,
even though the borders of both states were created by conflict
and both have engaged in the ethnic cleansing and religious
purging of minorities (9).
Neither state is regarded, in contrast to Israel, as an inherent
pariah. Neither state, therefore, is the subject of relentless
campaigns questioning their right to exist; nor are they the
targets of economic, academic and other boycotts. Hence, there
is a profound sense among many Jews, inside and outside Israel,
that they are being judged by criteria which apply to them alone.
And this does not even broach the specific political canards
which accompany delegitimisation, such as the claim that Israel
is an apartheid state, when the reality is that the only Arabs
in the Middle East who enjoy human and civil rights which conform
to democratic standards are those who are citizens of Israel.
Therefore,
delegitimisation is a concept which provides a meeting point
for both Left and Right versions of antisemitism. The classic
antisemitism associated with the xenophobic Right and its Leftist
variant are linked by a profound enmity toward the empowered,
autonomous Jew. For the extreme Right, antisemitism is based
on a dark fantasy about the malign effects of Jewish power,
which integrates the financial and the political spheres. In
the Leftist imagination, the only good Jew is the invisible
Jew, one who is assimilated totally by his surroundings. (10)
By contrast, Jewish national consciousness is, a priori,
reactionary, supremacist, and politically aligned with imperialism.
In order to understand why this is so, a closer examination
of the ideological development of the New Left is necessary.
From Suez to Saigon: Jews and the New Left
The year 1956 was an important milestone in the intellectual
evolution of what was to coalesce into the New Left in the coming
years. The Soviet intervention in Hungary provided stark evidence
of the culture of repression intrinsic to the Stalinist model
of socialism, while the failed Anglo-French intervention in
Egypt exposed the limits of imperial hubris. For many Leftists,
profound disillusionment with the Soviet Union coincided with
the hope that fertile ground for socialist politics would be
found in the new post-imperial states. Suez and Hungary thus
established the hallmarks of the New Left: a critical distancing
from the Soviet Union, even though this stopped short of outright
disavowal, and a broad identification with post-colonial regimes
in the developing world. In the latter case, the rampant human
rights abuses in these countries were either grudgingly conceded
or ignored altogether.
These
twin catalysts for the renewal of left-wing politics were neatly
captured by one of Britain's most noted New Left theoreticians,
the cultural historian Raymond Williams, who sought to explain
the new politics of the Left. 'Behind it,' wrote Williams (11),
'there was a political shockwave - first felt, as always, among
the young - from the combined effects of Hungary and Suez: a
bitter reaction against imperialism and that lying invasion
of Egypt, but also a bitter reaction against established Communism
of the kind associated with Stalin, and persisting, though in
less terrible forms, under his successors.'
Several
previously divergent constituencies were swept up by the new
current: revolutionary Leftists, disillusioned former members
of the Communist Party, advocates of nuclear disarmament, Labour
radicals and general egalitarians. Consequently, this burgeoning
Leftist movement adopted several basic principles that, with
hindsight, do not sit together comfortably: 'libertarian and
democratic,' Williams declared (12),
'and also militantly socialist and against capitalism and imperialism.'
Suez
is of concern to a study of antisemitism on the British Left
because of the involvement of Israel in the conflict and because
of certain parallels with the Iraq war of 2003. In 1956, Prime
Minister Anthony Eden's decision to strike at the Egyptian leader
Gamal Abd'el Nasser, following the latter's decision to nationalise
the Suez Canal, divided 'Englishmen against each other with
unusual passion' (13).
As with Iraq, at the outset of the Suez conflict, there were
two principle sides. Eden denounced Nasser and pointed to the
commercial and strategic significance of the Middle East in
general and the Suez Canal in particular. His opponents demanded
a different relationship with the post-colonial countries, based
upon the principle of the sovereign equality of states and universal
acquiescence to international laws and norms as embodied by
the UN Charter.
At
the same time, there were noteworthy differences with the Iraq
war. Critics of Tony Blair believed that he would follow in
Eden's path and end his Premiership broken by what they saw
as an irresponsible foreign adventure. As it turned out, it
was Saddam Hussein's regime which collapsed - the exact opposite
of Nasser, who withstood the assault and emerged from the conflict
as a titanic figure of Arab nationalism (14).
On the international level, the Suez intervention was sharply
opposed by the United States; this played a decisive role in
the decision to end hostilities and deploy a UN force separating
the Israeli and Egyptian armies. Most significant, from the
perspective of this essay, was that outside the Arab world there
was virtually no special emphasis on Israel's role alongside
Britain and France. Nor was there any thundering anti-Zionist
rhetoric from the war's opponents in the west. Suez was perhaps
the last occasion where it was possible to oppose great power
ambitions in the Middle East without denouncing Zionism at the
same time. During the 2003 war with Iraq, the notion that the
US was fighting the war for the overarching purpose of strengthening
Israel's strategic position - indeed, that this was above all
an 'Israeli' war - was commonplace on the Left (15).
But during the Suez conflict, the assertion of Arab commentators
and the Soviet government that the west had been duped by Zionism
did not resonate with the western Left (16).
Why
was this the case? To begin with, Israel had not yet been categorised,
in the moral hierarchies of the Left, as an 'oppressor' state.
Even though both the Suez conflict and the Algerian war for
independence from France had established solidarity with the
Arab cause as a sine qua non for the Left, it was not
until after 1967 that Israel and Zionism attracted the same
degree of contempt as had the pieds noirs. In part, this was
because of a strong sympathy for Israel, particularly in the
British Labour Party, as the renewed hope of a downtrodden people.
This meant that the 17 Jewish Labour MPs in 1956 were able to
oppose the Suez intervention without fundamentally compromising
their support for Israel, something made even easier by both
Eden's reluctance to link the Suez issue to Israel's security
and a residual antisemitism within the Conservative Party. The
American political scientist Leon Epstein illustrates an interesting
point in this regard (17).
As the House of Commons prepared to debate the Suez crisis,
the Jewish Labour MP and opponent of the Suez intervention,
Maurice Orbach, greeted Sir Thomas Moore, a Conservative MP
with a record of sympathy for the British fascist Oswald Moseley
and a supporter of Eden's policy, with the ironic cry, 'Another
friend of the Jews! Up the Blackshirts!'.
In
addition, the Palestinian refugees had not been established
as an independent political actor at the time of Suez. Although
Palestinian fedayeen began launching raids into Israel from
1949, the PLO was not formed until 1964 and did not assert its
independence from the Arab states until 1968, when it drew up
a Charter notable for its strident nationalist tone and implacable
enmity towards Zionism (18).
And finally, when the Suez crisis
erupted,
the Protocol between Britain, France and Israel drawn up at Sevres
in October 1956 - whereby France and Britain, following an Israeli
attack on Egypt, would issue an ultimatum for an end to the fighting
and then deploy French and British troops along key points of
the canal - was still shrouded in secrecy. Arabist writers have
pointed to the Sevres Protocol as proof of Israel's determination
to humble the Arab world now that the Palestinians had been dispossessed
(19). What this assertion
ignores, of course, is the question of Nasser's own intentions;
not only did he block the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping
and sponsor raids into Israeli territory, he had also assembled,
with Soviet and Czech assistance, an armed force more powerful
and threatening than all the other Arab armies combined (20).
The
nascent New Left did not, then, translate its opposition to
the Suez conflict into formal anti-Zionism: neither the Zionist
project, nor Israel's right to exist, were questioned, even
if there was some discomfort over Israel's decision to strike
at Egypt. Prior to the 1967 war, the most ferocious attacks
on Zionism emanated from the Soviet Union and its satellite
states, as well as from the pro-Moscow Communist Parties. As
David Cesarani has shown (21),
many of the propaganda themes which were eagerly adopted by
the far Left after 1967 - the illegitimacy of Israel as a state,
the fictitious collaboration between Zionists and Nazis - were
Muscovite in origin. In 1967, while the French Communist Party
newspaper L'Humanite was publishing articles questioning
Israel's right to exist and bracketing the Arab struggle against
Israel with the North Vietnamese struggle against the United
States, Jean-Paul Sartre, by now firmly in his revolutionary
phase, was expressing his anguish that the Jewish and Arab national
causes, both of which he was sympathetic to, were locked in
a deadly conflict. Sartre's agonising symbolised the position
of many Leftist intellectuals who were not prepared to follow
the harsh Soviet line on Israel.
An
interview given to the New Left Review, the leading journal of
British socialist intellectuals, by the Jewish Marxist historian
Isaac Deutscher in the aftermath of the 1967 war provides an instructive
contrast to the excesses of Soviet demonology (22).
It should be pointed out that Deutscher was decidedly not a Zionist;
his position might be described as 'anti anti-Zionist'. In an
essay published in 1954, Deutscher explained that his original
opposition to Zionism 'was based on a confidence in the European
labour movement, or, more broadly, in European society and civilisation,
which that society and civilisation have not justified.' (23)
Even so, he remained guarded in his approach to Israel, becoming
far more critical after the 1967 war, as the New Left Review interview
with him demonstrated.
Deutscher
described the Israelis as the 'Prussians of the Middle East',
warning them that their victory in 1967 contained the seeds
of the country's undoing. Israel's leaders, he said, were guilty
of mocking and exploiting the Holocaust for their own ends (although
it is important to note that Deutscher did not use Holocaust
imagery as a stick with which to beat the Israelis). Significantly,
Deutscher argued that it was flawed to perceive any moral equivalence
drawn between Zionism and Arab nationalism. As an anti-colonial
movement, Arab nationalism, he said, 'has its historic justification
and progressive aspect.'
That
said, Deutscher was careful not to question Israel's legitimacy
or right to exist, and he was concerned for its future. Israel's
'real friends', he said, would warn the country against continuing
down the road it had taken. He recognised the dangers of Arab
anti-Semitism - coining the term the 'anti-imperialism of fools'
- and the effects of this upon the Israeli psyche. Above all,
he understood that the memory of the Holocaust was still fresh.
For Deutscher, the challenge for Israel was to adopt a foreign
policy that was not dominated by the tragic narrative of the Jewish
experience in Europe.
Voices
on the Marxist Left such as Deutscher's - highly critical of
Israel, yet rooted in an understanding of Jewish history and
sympathetic to Jewish fears - were to become more and more isolated.
In another major article on the Middle East, published by the
New Left Review in 1969, Fawwaz Trabulsi argued for the dismantling
of Israel as a Jewish state (24).
It is equally true that Trabulsi scorned the various forms of
Arab nationalism, such as Nasserism and Ba'athism, and that
he denounced portrayal of the conflict in the Arab world as
the product of a 'Judeo-Zionist conspiracy'. But, unlike Deutscher,
there was no sensitivity to the centrality of Jewish memory
- just an assurance that Israelis need not regard the 'proletarian
vanguards of the Arab masses' with trepidation.
The Left Against Zion
If the Palestinians were invisible during the Suez conflict,
then perhaps the most significant consequence of the 1967 war
was, as the Israeli anti-Zionist Akiva Orr put it in the British
revolutionary newspaper Socialist Worker, their re-emergence
'as a political entity' (25).
From the late 1960s onwards, the Palestinian fedayeen organisations
engraved themselves on the consciousness of the western Left.
In Britain, organisations like the International Socialists
(which was to become the Socialist Worker's Party), the Workers
Revolutionary Party and sundry other Trotskyist and anarchist
groupuscles made anti-Zionism an integral part of the revolutionary
creed. The hostility escalated to such a degree that by 1982,
W.D. Rubinstein could state, in a survey of antisemitism on
the Left and the Right: 'Fringe neo-Nazi groups notwithstanding,
significant antisemitism is now almost exclusively a Left-wing
rather than a right-wing phenomenon.' (26)
Indeed,
the delegitimisation offensive against Israel presently pursued
by sections of the anti-globalisation movement, the far Left
and certain periodicals of the moderate Left - many of whose
themes are shared by Islamists and parts of the far right -
can reasonably be said to have begun in the aftermath of the
1967 war. It was then that the difference between the anti-Zionism
of the ancien Left and that espoused by its new incarnation
was established. As Robert Wistrich has argued, in becoming
a 'code word for the forces of reaction in general,' Zionism
assumed a global importance for the contemporary Left that not
even Marx and Lenin could have foreseen. Consequently, '[t]he
extreme Left in western societies not only denigrates Israel
and Zionism in a systematic manner, but its irrational hostility
frequently spills over into contempt or antipathy towards Jews
and Judaism as such.' (27)
This is graphically illustrated by a survey of Left-wing newspapers
and pamphlets from the late 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s - a
period which spanned the Yom Kippur War and the Lebanon war
and which witnessed the spread of Palestinian terrorism against
civilian targets, sometimes with the participation of European
terror groups such as the Red Army Faction, better known as
the 'Baader-Meinhoff Gang'.
What
is remarkable is that the same vulgar Marxist formula - made
up of incendiary denunciations, constant parallels between Israel
and Nazi Germany, portentous warnings about the extent of Jewish
power in the United States, facile guarantees that Jews should
not fear the Palestinian armed factions, and downright lying
about historical facts - has sustained what passes for comment
on the Middle East conflict in the journals of the Left for
nearly forty years. For example, in 1969, Socialist Worker
declared that 'Zionist gangs…ruthlessly wiped out Arab villages
and herded the people into concentration camps' (28)
(the latter claim is one which no serious Arab writer on the
Palestinian issue has ever made). One year later, the same paper,
without a shred of evidence, asserted that 'Zionist dockers
from Greece' had served as 'scab labour' to break the strike
organised in 1936 by the Arab Higher Committee against the British
authorities in Palestine (even if this claim was true, the subsequent
annihilation of the Jewish dockers of the northern Greek port
of Salonika by the Nazis should give pause for thought) (29).
Palestinians who hijacked civilian aircraft were saluted as
'brave…their cry must not go unanswered.' (30)
In 1976, following a successful Israeli raid to rescue hostages
held by Palestinian terrorists at Entebbe Airport - all of them
Jews deliberately separated from the non-Jewish passengers who
were released - Socialist Worker sneered: 'Page after
page of propaganda about "plucky little Israel" has
poured from the presses, without a word about the 1.5 million
Palestinian refugees.' (31)
Young
Socialist, a paper published by another Trotskyist group,
the Workers Revolutionary Party - which counted the actress
Vanessa Redgrave among its members and enjoyed financing at
different times from the Libyan and Iraqi regimes - was just
as inflammatory, if not more so. In 1982, during the Lebanon
war, the WRP accused Israel of 'a genocidal onslaught against
the Palestinian and Lebanese people.' (32)
Photographs of anti-Israeli rallies highlighted banners with
slogans such as 'Israeli Nazi Troops out of Lebanon' and 'Begin
is the Hitler of the 80s'. And, in a calumny that even Socialist
Worker might have shied away from, the WRP claimed: 'The Zionists
are employing horrendous gas weapons such as the ones used by
the Nazis against the Jewish people. Zionist imperialism is
planning to turn Beirut into a gas chamber for the Palestinians.'
(33) Another revolutionary
socialist newspaper, Big Flame, made a similar assertion: 'The
Israeli methods in Lebanon can derive their inspiration from
only one source: Nazi Germany.' (34)
Pro-Arab
organisations on the mainstream Left, no doubt encouraged by
the actions of more 'respectable' bodies such as the UN General
Assembly, which decreed in 1975 that Zionism was a form of racial
discrimination, were not averse to making wild allegations.
In a pamphlet published by the Labour Middle East Council, the
pro-Palestinian Labour MP David Watkins echoed the outlandish
conspiracy theories of the Arab press regarding Israeli ambitions:
'A pre-emptive war against Syria and Jordan would enable Israel
to occupy further large areas of these countries, including
Damascus and Amman…The long-standing Zionist dream of an empire
from the Nile to the Euphrates would then be appreciably nearer.'
(35) How would this
land-grab be assisted politically? 'There would be no shortage,'
wrote Watkins, 'of powerful calls for US acquiescence in such
an operation.' The underlying strategic aim, Watkins argued,
was the consolidation of Israeli and American control of the
oil fields in the Arab Gulf - a thesis which many on the Left
would still find perfectly plausible.
Some
of the most transparently antisemitic material can be found
in the newspaper Labour Herald. Now defunct, the paper
was co-edited by Ken Livingstone, at the time leader of the
Greater London Council (GLC) and presently Mayor of London.
As well as printing gushing propaganda on behalf of the North
Korean regime ('It is impossible not to be impressed by the
achievements of the Korean people…Pyongyang is one of the most
beautiful cities in the world, full of magnificent buildings')
(36), Labour Herald,
with Livingstone at the helm, ran cartoons which outdid the
other Leftists papers when it came to wounding and insulting
Jewish memories. During the Lebanon war, the Israeli Prime Minister,
Menachem Begin, was depicted wearing an SS uniform replete with
a 'Death's Head' cap, with the Star of David replacing swastika
on his armband. His right arm was raised in a Nazi salute and
he stood upon a pile of corpses. The cartoon was headed, in
gothic script, 'The Final Solution'. A speech bubble has Begin
saying, in the rhythms and cadences of a stereotypical Jewish
trader, 'Shalom? Who needs Shalom with Reagan behind you?'.
(37)
Another
Labour Herald cartoon showed Begin sitting in a large chair crowned
with the Nazi eagle. Behind him was a map of the larger Mediterranean
area, with names of the Arab countries, as well as Cyprus, Iran
and the eastern portion of Africa crossed out and replaced with
the word 'Israel'. The Mediterranean itself is renamed 'The Zionist
Sea'. Flanking him are boxes of weapons addressed to 'South American
fascists' and 'South Africa'. Begin is speaking into the phone.
In another evocation of the Jewish trader, he says: 'Settlement?
Of course we'll have settlements.' (38)
The
articles and images described above were united by a singular
aim: to show that the Jewish State had adopted the ideology
and methods of the very same regime which had exterminated six
million Jews during the Second World War. This dovetailed rather
neatly with another claim which remains widespread on the Left:
that the Zionist movement actively collaborated with the Nazis.
Whereas for the neo-Nazis the Holocaust is a hoax, for the far
Left 'the Holocaust now emerges as the Jews (or Jewish nationalism's)
greatest crime…the autogenocide of the Twentieth Century.' (39)
During the mid-1980s, this pernicious allegation departed from
the pages of relatively obscure Leftist periodicals for the
glamour of the London stage.
Perdition: A Dress Rehearsal
In 1986, the play Perdition, by the Marxist playwright
Jim Allen, brought the accusation of Zionist-Nazi collaboration
to the British public's attention for the first time . (40)
Until that point, the Left's discussion of Jews and Israel,
like most of its discussions, had been conducted internally,
with leaders defining the doctrine and foot soldiers repeating
it to each other. Now, a thesis that had been dismissed by scholars
of the Holocaust was suddenly granted a wider audience.
Perdition
was based on a well-known libel trial brought to the Jerusalem
district court in 1954 by the former Hungarian Zionist leader,
Rudolf Kastner. The defendant in the trial was an elderly Hungarian
Jew, Malkhiel Grunwald, who was charged with defaming Kastner
when he accused him of collaborating with the Nazis as they
prepared to exterminate Hungary's Jews in 1944. At the time,
Kastner's intent had been to negotiate a deal whereby the German
army would be supplied with ten thousands trucks in exchange
for a stay of execution. But according to Grunwald, Kastner
had facilitated, through his negotiations with Adolf Eichmann,
the destruction of Hungary's Jews while enriching himself personally.
The court acquitted Grunwald of the libel charge and strongly
criticised Kastner's behaviour in Hungary. Kastner himself was
assassinated just before Israel's Supreme Court overturned the
Jerusalem court's decision (41).
In
the hands of a talented dramatist, this story could have probed
the nature and limits of the moral choice confronting the leader
of a beleaguered community, as well as the complex motives of
the survivor who made these allegations. In Allen's hands, however,
any such nuances and subtleties were purged. In his own words,
Perdition was a tale of 'privileged Jewish leaders' collaborating
'in the extermination of their own kind in order to help bring
about a Zionist state, Israel, a state which itself is racist.'
(42)
The
announcement by London's Royal Court Theatre that it intended
to stage the play sparked a furious public debate. Many Jewish
scholars and leaders pointed to gross distortions and inaccuracies
in the text, asserting that Perdition was little more than standard
antisemitic conspiracy theory with a Leftist tinge. European
Zionists, the play charged, betrayed Europe's Jews while 'all-powerful
American Jewry' (a line from the play) discreetly approved the
strategy. Indeed, the text was replete with lines that equated
the power of Zionism with that of Nazism ('the Zionist knife
in the Nazi fist') and highlighted the selfishness of Jewish
leaders ('To save your hides, you practically led them to the
gas chambers of Auschwitz').
In
January 1987 the artistic director of the Royal Court, Max Stafford-Clark,
declared that his doubts about Perdition were grave enough
for him to cancel its performance. Although Stafford-Clark made
the decision on his own, Left-wing activists were quick to point
to a Zionist 'conspiracy' (43).
The film director Ken Loach, a close colleague of Allen, claimed
that the theater had caved in to pressure from prominent British
Jews such as Dr. Stephen Roth (the founder of the Institute
of Jewish Affairs, which became the Institute for Jewish Policy
Research) Lord Weidenfeld, and Lord Goodman; men, Loach said,
'who can pay their way.'
For
anyone exploring the recent history of antisemitism on the British
Left, the Perdition affair is seminal for at least two
reasons. First, the immense press coverage the affair generated
meant that extreme anti-Zionist claims won wider attention,
particularly among Britain's liberally inclined intelligentsia;
as the past was interpreted through the prejudices of the present-the
perception of Israel as a racist, militarist state-it is not
surprising that these claims were given serious and sometimes
sympathetic attention. Second, the affair rehabilitated the
myth of the nefarious, transcendental power of Jewish individuals
and organizations, whether manifested in wartime Hungary (the
subject matter of the play) or modern-day London (the reason
for the play's cancellation). Since 2000, a similar Judeophobic
discourse, which carries both implicit and explicit warnings
about the dangerous extent of Jewish power, has resurfaced in
Britain.
Conclusion: The Red-Green Alliance
The spillage of anti-Zionism into antisemitism is an increasingly
perilous feature of British political life, as it is elsewhere
in Europe. As this chapter has attempted to demonstrate, this
development is largely the consequence of a long campaign of delegitimisation
which began on the far Left and spread into the mainstream. Hence,
it is critical to understand that the 'New Antisemitism' has firm
historical foundations. Yet it is equally true that, since the
end of the Second World War, the conditions which enable the expression
of anti-Jewish sentiment in democratic countries like Britain
have rarely been as permissive as they are now. To understand
why this is the case, it necessary to explore in greater detail
an issue mentioned at the beginning of this paper: the growing
intimacy between the Left and the Islamists.
The
very existence of this alliance represents a decisive shift
for the Left. Radical socialism and radical Islam are far from
obvious bedfellows and a strict focus on the key texts of both
does not yield any synergies. Indeed, for many Islamist theoreticians,
communism and Zionism are two sides of the same coin. To take
one of many examples, the pamphleteer Salah al Din al Munajjid
argued that, since Marx was a Jew, communism and Zionism were
'slightly different means for solving the Jewish question and
for serving Jewish interests. The guiding force behind their
unholy alliance was the desire to destroy the Muslim world.'
(44) In the light of
the failures of Arab nationalism and Soviet communism, ideas
such as these have found a receptive audience in the Arab countries
and the wider Muslim world.
Out
of necessity, perhaps, Muslim activists in Britain and Europe
have taken a different approach to politics. In recent years,
an alliance with the Left has become tactically prudent, given
their shared concerns regarding discrimination, economic marginalisation
and US foreign policy. Even so, this does not mean that traditionally
liberal or progressive ideas have taken hold within Muslim communities.
An abiding distaste persists for many of the issues which the
Left has championed, such as women's equality and gay liberation.
Moreover,
while other minorities in Europe are generally identified by their
original nationality (Indians or Ghanaians or Jamaicans), those
from Islamic countries are merged together as 'Muslims', despite
coming from vastly different cultures such as Bangladesh, Somalia
and Egypt. This is not, however, the consequence of external prejudice.
Muslim minorities have not been Islamicised because of a hostile
press and public unwilling to appreciate communal and ethnic differences.
The adoption of a Muslim identity which transcends such differences
has been initiated in part by their own communal organisations
and in part by anti-racist bodies (45).
One result of this has been the entrenching and strengthening
of organisations such as the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB)
which, while participating with non-Muslims in the political process,
utterly disdains the secular character of western societies.
Given
the key doctrinal differences among various Islamist schools,
it hardly needs mentioning that not all of them sanction the
participation of Muslim organisations in the politics of non-Muslim
societies. For those groups committed to the revival of the
Khilafah (Islamic Caliphate) through jihad, collaboration with
non-Muslims is forbidden. Other groups, in the salafist tradition,
scorn political activity altogether. The groups which have reached
out to the Left, and which seek to extend Muslim influence through
political activities, are those influenced by the ideas of the
Muslim Brotherhood (46).
In
Britain, the consolidation of London - nicknamed 'Londonistan'
- as a centre of Islamist publishing and organising since the
1980s, the growing politicisation of Britain's Muslim minorities
on issues from the angry demonstrations against Salman Rushdie's
novel, The Satanic Verses, through to the ongoing debate
over state funding for Muslim schools, and the realisation that
Muslims can flex electoral muscle, have all contributed to the
formation of the 'Red-Green' Alliance. For the Left, groping for
a cogent response to the post-Cold War order, there are clear
advantages to an alignment with Muslim organisations: an empathetic
constituency, the prospect of winning votes which might otherwise
go the established parties, ideological renewal through an alliance
with the 'oppressed'. For those Muslim organisations which take
a more nuanced view of politics, a partnership with the Left offers
the prospect of appealing for support beyond their own communities
on a range of issues.
In
particular, the issue of Palestine is a central campaign; so
far, the Islamists have been extremely successful. 'Freedom
for Palestine' was one of the main themes of the massive demonstration
against the Iraq intervention which took place in London early
in 2003, jointly sponsored by far Left organisations and MAB.
At the European Social Forum, which took place in London in
October 2004 with generous financial support for the Greater
London Authority (GLA), dozens of workshops and seminars were
held on the subject of the Palestinians, including one session
which attacked Zionism specifically. And when organisations
like MAB, which openly supports the Palestinian terror group
Hamas, are finding an increasingly receptive audience on the
British Left, whether in the 'Stop the War Coalition' or the
'Respect' political party, and when even extreme Right publications
like 'Spearhead' maintain that 'Zionism' is the major threat
in Britain, the political outlook is worrisome. Furthermore,
the stakes are higher than many realise. As Giles Kepel has
argued, since the Madrid bombings of 2004, Europe has emerged
as 'the primary battlefield on which the future of global Islam
will be decided.' (47)
Much
has changed, but much has stayed the same. The denial of victimhood
to the Jews, the plundering of the Holocaust to condemn Israel
(48), the conspiratorial
portrayal of Jewish power and the inherent illegitimacy of Jewish
self-determination are all constants. However, the Judeophobia
of the British Left is integrating, ideologically and organisationally,
with its Islamist counterpart. Consequently, British political
discourse in the mosque, the street and the salon has been infected.
This last assertion is not intended to subsume peculiarities
and differences into a single framework; rather, the aim has
been to discern a general pattern of Judeophobia and antisemitism
in Britain which, ominously, continues to develop.
Notes
1
Irving Howe, 'New Styles in "Leftism"',
Dissent 13 (Summer 1965), reproduced in Selected Writings
1950-1990, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1990,
pps. 193-220
2 See Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth,
Grove Press, New York, 1968 and Black Skin, White Masks,
Pluto Press, London, 1986
3 Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, Manchester
University Press, 1986, Regis Debray, Prison Writings,
Penguin, London, 1975
4 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, op
cit. p. 40
5 See the report in Socialist Worker,
No. 122, 15 May 1969
6 For a comprehensive overview of contemporary
trends in anti-Jewish discourse, see Paul Iganski and Barry
Kosmin (Eds.), A New Antisemitism? Debating Judeophobia in
21st Century Britain, Profile Books, London, 2003 and Ron
Rosenbaum (Ed.) Those Who Forget The Past - The Question
Of Antisemitism, Random House, New York, 2004
7 See Dave Hyde, 'Europe's Other Red-Green Alliance',
Zeek, April 2003, available at http://www.zeek.net/politics_0304.shtml
8 See Daniel Goldhagen, 'The Globalization of
Antisemitism', in Forward, 2 May 2003
9 Sudan was embroiled in a civil war against
Christian and animist minorities in the south until 2004. In
2003, Arab militia backed by the Sudanese government began an
ethnic cleansing campaign against non-Arab tribes in the western
Darfur region. See Samantha Power, 'Dying in Darfur', The
New Yorker, 30 August 2004. Syria, meanwhile, has a record
of persecuting its Kurdish minority. See Mustafa Nazdar, 'The
Kurds in Syria', in Gerard Chaliand (Ed.), People Without
A Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, Zed Press, London, 1980
10 As the Austro-Marxist Karl Kautsky put it,
'We cannot say we have completely emerged from the Middle Ages
as long as Judaism still exists among us. The sooner it disappears,
the better it will be, not only for society, but also for the
Jews themselves.' Karl Kautsky, Are the Jews a Race?,
Jonathan Cape, London, 1926, also available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/kautsky/1914/jewsrace/index.htm
11Raymond Williams, 'Why Do I Demonstrate?',
in Resources of Hope, Verso, London, 1989, p.62
12 ibid.
13 Leon D. Epstein, British Politics in
the Suez Crisis, Pall Mall Press, London, 1964, p.2
14 Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab
Peoples, Faber and Faber, London, 1991, pps. 367-69
15 See, for example, Simon Tisdall, 'Bush and
Kerry dance to the tune of Ariel Sharon', in The Guardian,
20 October 2004
16 The Soviet Premier, Nikolai Bulganin, accused
Israel of 'playing with the fate of the world.' See Avi Shlaim,
The Iron Wall, Penguin, London, 2000, p. 181
17 Epstein op cit., p. 177
18 The Palestine National Covenant, 1968, reproduced
in Yehuda Lukacs (Ed.), Documents on the Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict 1967-83, Cambridge University Press, 1984, pps.
139-43
19 See Maxime Rodinson, Israel and the Arabs,
Pelican, London, 1968, pps.74-5. See also 'Eden Shredded Suez
Secrets', in The Sunday Times, 6 September 1998
20 See the section on Suez in Michael Oren,
Six Days of War, Penguin, London, 2002, pps. 9-12
21 David Cesarani, The Left and The Jews,
The Jews and The Left, published by Labour Friends of Israel,
London, 2004, pps. 60-71
22 Isaac Deutscher, 'The Israeli-Arab War,
June 1967', reprinted in The Non-Jewish Jew, Merlin Press,
London, 1981, pps. 126-52
23 Deutscher, 'Israel's Spiritual Climate',
in The Non-Jewish Jew, op. cit. p. 111
24 Fawwaz Trabulsi, 'The Palestine Problem',
in New Left Review No. 57, September/October 1969
25 Akiva Orr, 'Whirlpool of Instability gives
hope to Arab Liberation Forces', in Socialist Worker,
No. 84, June 1968
26 W.D. Rubinstein, The Left, The Right
and the Jews, Croom Helm, London, 1982, p. 9
27 Robert Wistrich, Left-Wing Anti-Zionism
in Western Societies, in R. Wistrich (ed). Anti-Zionism
and Anti-Semitism in the Contemporary World, London, Macmillan,
1990, p. 48
28 Socialist Worker, No. 103, 4 January
1969
29 Socialist Worker, No. 160, 26 February
1970
30 Socialist Worker, No. 187, 19 September
1970
31 Socialist Worker, No. 488, 7 August
1976
32 Young Socialist, Vol. 7, No. 12,
12 June 1982
33 Young Socialist, Vol. 7, No. 16,
3 July 1982
34 Big Flame, No. 107, July/August 1982
35 David Watkins, The World and Palestine,
Labour Middle East Council, London, 1980
36 Labour Herald, Vol. 2. No. 49, 12
August 1983. The article is headlined 'Recognise North Korea!'.
37 Labour Herald, Vol. 2. No. 18, 7
January 1983
38 Labour Herald, Vol. 2. No. 35, 6
May 1983
39 Rubinstein, op. cit. p.115
40 Perdition was published in 1987 by
the anti-Zionist publishing house Ithaca Press
41 See Leora Bilsky, 'Judging Evil in The Trial
of Kastner', Law and History Review, Vol.19 No.
1, Spring 2001
42 Quoted in David Cesarani, The Perdition
Affair, in Wistrich, op. cit, p. 54
43 Ibid, p.57
44 Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab
Political Thought and Practice since 1967, Cambridge University
Press, 1992, p. 76
45 Nick Cohen, 'Muslim is not a dirty word',
in New Statesman, 4 October 2004
46 See Giles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds:
Islam and the West, Harvard University Press, 2004,
p. 265
47 ibid. p. 241
48 A notorious example of the abuse of Holocaust
imagery involved the poet and critic Tom Paulin, who, after
telling Al Ahram in 2002 that 'Brooklyn-born' Jewish
settlers should be shot, wrote a poem which described Israeli
soldiers as the 'Zionist SS'; as this chapter has demonstrated,
such invocations of Nazism have plenty of precedents
About the author
Ben
Cohen is a London-based writer and broadcaster. A former producer
with the BBC, he is now a director of Global Radio News, an
international news agency. A specialist on Balkan and Middle
Eastern politics, he served with the United Nations Protection
Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia and was the editor
of With No Peace to Keep: United Nations Peacekeeping in the
former Yugoslavia (London, 1995). He has also contributed to
a number of periodicals in Israel, including the Jewish Political
Studies Review and the Hebrew journal Eretz Acheret.
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